

# Fuzzing Sucks!

## Introducing Sulley Fuzzing Framework

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## About Us


- Work at TippingPoint's Digital Vaccine Labs
  - Responsible for vuln-dev, patch analysis, pen-testing
  - Keep tabs on us at <http://dvlabs.tippingpoint.com>
- Launched OpenRCE.org over two years ago
  - How many here are members?
  - Some interesting updates on the horizon after BlackHat
- Creators of PaiMei RE framework
  - How many here have heard of it?
  - Lot of exciting developments coming up after BlackHat
- Co-authored "Fuzzing: Brute Force Vulnerability Discovery"

# Talk Outline

- Background
  - Why does fuzzing suck?
  - How can we make it better?
- Sulley's Architecture
  - Component Breakdown
  - Advanced Features
- Usage and Walkthrough
  - Hewlett-Packard Data Protector Audit
  - Trend Micro Server Protect Audit
- Future Development
  - What's still on the drawing board



## Is Fuzzing a "Dead Horse"?



The screenshot shows a blog post with a dark background and white text. At the top, there is a navigation bar with a search box, a 'SEARCH BLOG' button, a 'FLAG BLOG' button, and a 'Next Blog' link. The main title of the post is 'INFORMATION SECURITY SELL OUT' in large, bold, white capital letters. Below the title is a subtitle in smaller white capital letters: 'THE TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH ABOUT AN INDUSTRY FULL OF SNAKE OIL SALESMEN, PIMPS, AND WHORES. YES, I AM TALKING ABOUT INFORMATION SECURITY.' The date of the post is 'TUESDAY, MAY 29, 2007'. The post title is 'BlackHat Speakers List' in green. Below the title is the URL 'http://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-07/bh-usa-07-speakers.html'. There is a line of text in italics: '[ content stripped for the sake of brevity... ]'. The main body of the post contains two paragraphs of white text: 'We have Pedram Amini talking about, yes you guessed it, fuzzing.' and 'Again. This is a dead horse, can we drag it to the glue factory already?'.

### Negative

Entire BlackHat track, 3 dedicated books, more commercial vendors and still highly effective.

# Old School

- antiparser
  - David McKinney, Python, x-platform, API driven
- DFUZ
  - Diego Bauche, custom language, Unix
- SPIKE
  - Dave Aitel, C, Unix, block based
- The list goes on ...
  - Angel
  - Fuzzer Framework
  - Fuzzled
  - Fuzzy Packet
  - The Art of Fuzzing
  - SPIKEfile
  - ...

# DFUZ FTP Example

## Notes

The custom language is easy to understand but very limiting.

```
port=21/tcp

peer write: @ftp:user("user")
peer read
peer write: @ftp:pass("pass")
peer read
peer write: "CWD /", %random:data(1024,alphanum), 0x0a
peer read
peer write: @ftp:quit()
peer read

repeat=1024
wait=1
# No Options
```

# SPIKE FTP Example

## Notes

SPIKE data representation syntax is very simple, perhaps why it's the most commonly used fuzzer?

```
s_string("HOST ");  
s_string_variable("10.20.30.40");  
s_string("\r\n");
```

```
s_string_variable("USER");  
s_string(" ");  
s_string_variable("bob");  
s_string("\r\n");  
s_string("PASS ");  
s_string_variable("bob");  
s_string("\r\n");
```

```
s_string("SITE ");  
s_string_variable("SEDV");  
s_string("\r\n");
```

```
s_string("CWD ");  
s_string_variable(".");  
s_string("\r\n");
```

## New School

- Peach
  - Michael Eddington, Python, x-platform, highly modularized
- Codenomicon
  - Commercial vendor, Java, x-platform, pre-recorded test cases
- GPF
  - Jared Demott, mixed, x-platform, varying fuzz modes
- Autodafe
  - Martin Vuagnoux, C, Unix, next-gen SPIKE
  - First fuzzer to bundle debugger functionality
- Evolutionary Fuzzers
  - SideWinder, Sherri Sparks et al.
  - EFS, Jared Demott
- Protocol Informatics Framework
  - Marshall Beddoe, Python, x-platform, automated protocol field identification tool

# Peach FTP Example

## Notes

There is a non trivial learning curve to writing Peach fuzzers.

```
from Peach                import *
from Peach.Transformers  import *
from Peach.Generators    import *
from Peach.Protocols     import *
from Peach.Publishers    import *

loginGroup = group.Group()
loginBlock = block.Block()
loginBlock.setGenerators((
    static.Static("USER username\r\nPASS "),
    dictionary.Dictionary(loginGroup, "dict.txt"),
    static.Static("\r\nQUIT\r\n")
))

loginProt = null.NullStdout(ftp.BasicFtp('127.0.0.1', 21), loginBlock)

script.Script(loginProt, loginGroup, 0.25).go()
```

# GPF FTP Example

## Notes

Data representation format is very different from other examples.

```
Source:S Size:20 Data:220 (vsFTPd 1.1.3)
Source:C Size:12 Data:USER jared
Source:S Size:34 Data:331 Please specify the password.
Source:C Size:12 Data:PASS jared
Source:S Size:33 Data:230 Login successful. Have fun.
Source:C Size:6 Data:QUIT
Source:S Size:14 Data:221 Goodbye.
```

...

The command line can be a bit unwieldy:

```
GPF ftp.gpf client localhost 21 ? TCP 8973987234 100000 0 + 6 6 100 100 5000 43 finsih 0 3 auto none -G b
```

## So Why Does Fuzzing Hurt So Bad?

- The existing tools contribute solid ideas but are limited in usage
- Basically all of them are focused solely on data generation
- Let's jump through some fuzzer requirements to get a feel for what's missing
  - Essentially Chapter 5 from the fuzzing book
- At each juncture we'll briefly cover Sulley's solution
- We'll drill down into the specifics when we cover architecture

## Easy to Use and Powerfully Flexible

### Pain

- Powerful frameworks have a huge learning curve
- Simple frameworks quickly reach limitations

### Remedy

- Sulley utilizes block based data representation
- Sulley fuzzers start simple and don't have messy syntax
  - Optional elements and keyword arguments
- Fuzzers are written in pure Python and can benefit from the languages features and ease of use
- Development efforts can be easily shared
- Can handle challenge-response and prev-packet-length situations

## Reproducibility and Documentation

### Pain

- Individual test cases must be reproducible
- Progress and interim results should be recorded

### Remedy

- Sulley can replay individual test cases
- Sulley keeps a bi-directional PCAP of every transaction
- A built in web interface provides interactive feedback

# Reusability

## Pain

- Non-generic fuzzers can never be used again
- Widely used protocol components are re-developed all the time

## Remedy

- Sulley supports the creation and reuse of complex types and helper functions
- The more Sulley is used, the smarter it gets

## Process State and Process Depth

### Pain

- None of the existing fuzzers consider state paths
  - Fuzzing A-B-D vs. A-C-D
- Many fuzzers can only scratch a protocol surface
  - Fuzzing A only

### Remedy

- In Sulley you build fuzzers in manageable chunks called **requests**
- These **requests** are tied together in a graph
- The graph is automatically walked and each state path and depth is individually fuzzed

# Tracking, Code Coverage and Metrics

## Pain

- How much of the target code was exercised?
- What code was executed to handle a specific test case?

## Remedy

- Sulley supports an extensible **agent** model
- Utilizes PaiMei/PyDbg for breakpoint-based and MSR-based code coverage tracking

# Fault Detection and Recovery

## Pain

- Most fuzzers rely solely on a lack of response to determine when something bad happens
  - ahem ahem Codenomicon
- Once a fault is discovered, most fuzzers simply stop!
  - Mu Security and BreakingPoint take the interesting approach of power cycling

## Remedy

- Sulley bundles a debugger monitor agent
- Sulley can restore target health and continue testing by:
  - Restarting the target service
  - Restoring a VMware snapshot

# Resource Constraints


## Pain

- Non-technical constraints such as time and man power often get in the way

## Remedy

- Sulley bundles utilities such as a PDML parser to save time
- Sulley is designed to allow multiple people to work together easily
- The monitoring and self recording features of the framework save a great deal of time

# Sulley Architecture Diagram



## Four Major Components


- Data Generation
  - You build **requests** out of **primitives** and **legos**
  - **Legos** are complex types that extend the framework
- Session Management / Driver
  - **Requests** are chained together in a graph to form a **session**
  - The session class exposes a standalone web interface for monitoring and control
  - The driver ties **targets**, **agents** and **requests** together
- Agents
  - Interface with the target for instrumentation and logging purposes
- Utilities
  - Standalone command line utilities that perform a variety of tasks

## General Usage


- Sniff some traffic or reverse some protocol parsing binary
- Break the target protocol into individual requests
- Represent each request with a series of primitives
  - Individual requests can be tasked out to different people
- Setup some targets in conjunction with various agents
- Write a driver script which instantiates a session and ties requests, agents and the targets together
- Fuzz!
- Review results

### Drill Down

Let's take a look at each individual component in detail...



## Data Generation



# Overview

- Aitel really had it right
- The block based approach to protocol representation is simple, flexible and powerful
- Protocols are represented in Sulley as a collection of primitives, blocks and block helpers
- These elements have many optional arguments
- The **name** optional argument gives you direct access to an element without having to walk the stack
- Refer to the Epydoc generation API documentation for a complete reference of optional arguments
- Begin the definition of a request with:
  - `s_initialize("request name")`

## Static and Random Primitives

- `s_static()` is the simplest primitive adding a constant to the stack
  - Aliases include `s_dunno()`, `s_raw()` and `s_unknown()`
- `s_binary()` is related and should be familiar to SPIKE users:
  - `s_binary("0xde 0xad be ef \xca fe 00 01 02 0xba0xdd")`
- Sulley primitives are driven by heuristics, with the exception of `s_random()`
- `s_random()` used to generate random data of varying lengths
  - `min_length` and `max_length` are mandatory arguments
  - `num_mutations` defaults to 25 and specifies how many values to cycle through prior to returning to default

# Integer Primitives

- Simple types for dealing with integer fields
  - `s_char()`, `s_short()`, `s_long()`, `s_double()`
  - Convenience aliases exist like `byte`, `word`, `dword`, `int`, etc...
- You can fuzz through the entire valid range
- Defaults to a subset of potentially interesting values
  - To increase throughput
- Supports ASCII (signed or unsigned) and binary output rendering

# Strings and Delimiters

- `s_string()` supports static sizes, variable padding and custom
  - Over 1,000 test cases in string **fuzz library**
- Strings are frequently parsed into sub-fields with delimiters
- Sulley has a special primitive for delimiters, `s_delim()`, here is an example:

```
# fuzzes the string: <BODY bgcolor="black">
s_delim("<")
s_string("BODY")
s_delim(" ")
s_string("bgcolor")
s_delim("=")
s_delim("\"")
s_string("black")
s_delim("\\"")
s_delim(">")
```

# Blocks

- Primitives (and blocks) can be organized and nested within blocks
- Blocks are opened and closed with `s_block_start()` and `s_block_end()` respectively
- Blocks can be associated with a **group**, **encoder** or **dependency**
- Grouping, encoding and dependencies are powerful features we examine individually
- `s_block_start()` returns `True` so you can tab out for readability:

```
# Blocks must be given a name.  
if s_block_start("my block"):  
    s_string("fuzzy")  
s_block_end()
```

# Groups

- Groups tie a block to a defined set of values
- The block is cycled through for each value in the group
- Useful for representing a valid list of opcodes or verbs:

```
# define a group primitive listing the various HTTP verbs we wish to fuzz.
s_group("verbs", values=["GET", "HEAD", "POST", "TRACE"])

# define a new block named "body" and associate with the above group.
if s_block_start("body", group="verbs"):
    s_delim(" ")
    s_delim("/")
    s_string("index.html")
    s_delim(" ")
    s_string("HTTP")
    s_delim("/")
    s_string("1")
    s_delim(".")
    s_string("1")
    s_static("\r\n\r\n")
s_block_end("body")
```

# Encoders

- Simple yet powerful block modifier
- Connect a function with a block to modify contents post render
- Implement compression, custom obfuscation, etc:

```
def trend_xor_encode (str):  
    key = 0xA8534344  
    pad = 4 - (len(str) % 4)  
  
    if pad == 4: pad = 0  
    str += "\x00" * pad  
  
    while str:  
        dword = struct.unpack("<L", str[:4])[0]  
        str = str[4:]  
        dword ^= key  
        ret += struct.pack("<L", dword)  
        key = dword  
    return ret
```

# Dependencies

- Allow you to apply a conditional to the rendering of a block
- Done by specifying **dep**, **dep\_value(s)** and **dep\_compare**
- Block dependencies can be chained together arbitrarily

```
s_short("opcode", full_range=True)

if s_block_start("auth", dep="opcode", dep_value=10):
    s_string("aaron")
s_block_end()

if s_block_start("hostname", dep="opcode", dep_values=[15, 16]):
    s_string("aportnoy.openrce.org")
s_block_end()

# the rest of the opcodes take a string prefixed with two underscores.
if s_block_start("something", dep="opcode", dep_values=[10, 15, 16], dep_compare!="="):
    s_static("__")
    s_int(10)
s_block_end()
```

# Sizers

- Use `s_size()` to dynamically measure and render a blocks size
- Many optional arguments for flexibility
  - **length** of size field, default is 4
  - **endian**ess of size field, default is little
  - Output **format**, "binary" (default) or "ascii"
  - **inclusive**, whether the sizer should count itself
  - With ASCII output control **signed** vs. unsigned
- Sizers can also be fuzzed

# Checksums

- Similar to a sizer, `s_checksum()` calculates and render the checksum for a block
- Keyword argument `algorithm` can be one of:
  - "crc32"
  - "adler32"
  - "md5"
  - "sha1"
  - or any arbitrary function pointer
- `endianness` can be toggled

# Repeaters

- Use `s.repeat()` to handle block repetitions
- Useful for fuzzing multi-entry table parsers
- Can variable `step` from `min_reps` to `max_reps`
- Alternatively the repeat factor can be tied to another `variable`

```
# table entry: [type][len][string]
if s_block_start("table entry"):
    s_random("\x00\x00", 2, 2)
    s_size("string field", length=2)

    if s_block_start("string field"):
        s_string("C" * 10)
    s_block_end()
s_block_end()

# repeat the table entry from 100 to 1,000 reps stepping 50 elements on each iteration.
s_repeat("table entry", min_reps=100, max_reps=1000, step=50)
```

# Legos


- Sulley supports the creation of complex types called Legos
- Example Legos include: E-mail addresses, IP addresses, DCERPC, XDR and ASN.1 / BER primitives, XML tags, etc...
- The more Legos you define, the easier fuzzing is in the future

```
class tag (blocks.block):
    def __init__(self, name, request, value, options=):
        blocks.block.__init__(self, name, request, None, None, None)

        self.value = value
        self.options = options

    # [delim][string][delim]
    self.push(primitives.delim("<"))
    self.push(primitives.string(self.value))
    self.push(primitives.delim(">"))

# example instantiation.
s_lego("tag", "center")
```



# Session Management

pGraph



Session




# pGraph

- Python graph abstraction library
- Developed originally for PaiMei
- Allows for simple graph construction, manipulation and rendering
- Rendering formats supported are GML, GraphViz and uDraw
- The session class extends from this...

## Session Class

- Connect multiple **requests** in a graph
- Register pre and post send callbacks
- Assign a callback to each edge
- Add multiple network targets
- Exposes a custom web interface
- Automatically communicates with registered agents
- Responsible for walking the graph and fuzzing at each level
- Tightly used and related to the creation of **drivers**

## Session Illustrated




- This example demonstrates multiple paths and depths
- Callbacks aren't really needed here
  - More applicable in cases of RPC, challenge-response, prev-packet specifies length, etc...

## Interactive Web Interface

The screenshot shows the 'Sulley Fuzz Control' interface. At the top right, the status is 'RUNNING' in green. Below this, progress information is displayed: 'Total: 43 of 221 [=====] 19.457%' and '5168: op-3: 4 of 84 [=] 4.762%'. There are 'Pause' and 'Resume' buttons. A table with two columns, 'Test Case #' and 'Crash Synopsis', is shown below. The first row contains the test case ID '000042' and the crash synopsis: '[INVALID]:41414141 Unable to disassemble at 41414141 from thread 628 caused access violation'.

Test Case #	Crash Synopsis
000042	[INVALID]:41414141 Unable to disassemble at 41414141 from thread 628 caused access violation

- View fuzzer progress
- View detected faults
- Retrieve per-fault crash dump and packet capture
- Pause and resume fuzzing



## Agents

VMControl



Netmon



Procmon



...

# Agents

- A flexible sub-system allows you to create custom agents
- Client-server communication is extremely simple over "PedRPC"
  - Create a class that extend from `pedrpc.server`
  - Instantiate `pedrpc.client`
  - Call class members as if they are local
- Some agents have already been developed...

# Agent: Netmon

- Monitors network traffic and saves PCAPs to disk
- Per test case bi-directional packet capture

```
ERR> USAGE: network_monitor.py
  <-d|--device DEVICE #>   device to sniff on (see list below)
  [-f|--filter PCAP FILTER] BPF filter string
  [-p|--log_path PATH]     log directory to store pcaps to
  [-l|--log_level LEVEL]   log level (default 1), increase for more verbosity
  [--port PORT]            TCP port to bind this agent to
```

## Network Device List:

```
[0] \Device\NPF_GenericDialupAdapter
[1] {2D938150-427D-445F-93D6-A913B4EA20C0} 192.168.181.1
[2] {9AF9AAEC-C362-4642-9A3F-0768CDA60942} 0.0.0.0
[3] {9ADCDA98-A452-4956-9408-0968ACC1F482} 192.168.81.193
...
```

## Agent: Procmon


- PyDbg based fault monitoring engine
- Used to monitor target health
- Detected faults are catalogued in a "crash bin"
  - Allows for simplistic (backtrace driven) fault clustering
  - More on this later

```
ERR> USAGE: process_monitor.py
      <-c|--crash_bin FILENAME> filename to serialize crash bin class to
      [-p|--proc_name NAME]     process name to search for and attach to
      [-i|--ignore_pid PID]     ignore this PID when searching for the target process
      [-l|--log_level LEVEL]    log level (default 1), increase for more verbosity
      [--port PORT]             TCP port to bind this agent to
```



# Agent: VMControl

- Exposes network API for VMWare instrumentation
  - Simple PedRPC wrapper around vmrun.exe
  - Start, stop, suspend, snapshot, revert, etc...
- Used to restore target health after a fault is induced

```
ERR> USAGE: vmcontrol.py
<-x|--vmx FILENAME>      path to VMX to control
<-r|--vmrun FILENAME>    path to vmrun.exe
[-s|--snapshot NAME>    set the snapshot name
[-l|--log_level LEVEL]   log level (default 1), increase for more verbosity
[-i|--interactive]       Interactive mode, prompts for input values
[--port PORT]            TCP port to bind this agent to
```



## Driver



# Driver

- The driver is where it all comes together:
  - Import requests from the request library
  - Instantiate a session instance
  - Instantiate and add target instances to the session
  - Interconnect the requests to form a graph
  - Start fuzzing
- This is where edge and pre/post send callbacks should be defined
- The driver is entirely free form, though most of them will follow a simple and similar structure

# Example Driver

```
from sulley import *
from requests import jabber


def init_message(sock):
    init = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>\n'
    init += '<stream:stream to="10.10.20.16" xmlns="jabber:client" xmlns:stream="http://etherx.jabber.org">'

    sock.send(init)
    sock.recv(1024)

sess = sessions.session(session_filename="audits/trillian.session")
target = sessions.target("10.10.20.16", 5298)
target.netmon = pedrpc.client("10.10.20.16", 26001)
target.procmon = pedrpc.client("10.10.20.16", 26002)
target.vmcontrol = pedrpc.client("127.0.0.1", 26003)

# start up the target.
target.vmcontrol.restart_target()
print "virtual machine up and running"

sess.add_target(target)
sess.pre_send = init_message
sess.connect(s_get("chat message"))
sess.fuzz()
```



## Utilities

crashbin\_explorer

ida\_fuzz\_library\_extender

pcap\_cleaner

pdml\_parser

sequence\_honer



## crashbin\_explorer.py

- View every test case which caused a fault
- List every location where a fault occurred
- Retrieve saved crash dumps
- Render a graph which clusters faults by stack trace

```
$ ./utils/crashbin_explorer.py
  USAGE: crashbin_explorer.py <xxx.crashbin>
         [-t|--test #]      dump the crash synopsis for a specific test case number
         [-g|--graph name] generate a graph of all crash paths, save to 'name'.udg
```

- Pedram will actually demo this in a bit

## ida\_fuzz\_library\_extender.py

- IDA Python script
- Simple concept
  - Enumerate all constant integer comparisons in target binary
  - Enumerate all constant string comparisons in target binary
  - Add to fuzz library heuristics
- This is a pre-fuzz static analysis script
- A more advanced run-time implementation is still in the works
- Fuzz library extensions are handled via `.fuzz_strings` and `.fuzz_ints`

## pcap\_cleaner.py

- Simple utility
- Iterates through a crashbin and removes any PCAPs not associated with a fault
- Save on disk space prior to archiving a completed audit

```
$ ./utils/pcap_cleaner.py  
USAGE: pcap_cleaner.py <xxx.crashbin> <path to pcaps>
```

## pdml\_parser.py

- Convenience utility
- Converts PDML dump from Wireshark to a Sulley request
- Easier than doing so manually, work is still required of course

# Hewlett-Packard Data Protector

- Simple protocol to reverse and represent
- Simple bug (currently 0day, fix is just around the corner)
- Good starting example

# Trend Micro ServerProtect

- Microsoft RPC interface
- **Tons** of bugs in this thing
- Some have been reported and fixed, others are still pending
- Interesting demo since we can show off the fact that Sulley can fuzz DCE/RPC

## Sequence "Honing"

- Say test case #100 triggered a fault but replaying it does not
- Probably relies on some previous test or sequence of tests
- We can automatically deduce the exact sequence required for replication
- This is done, but I'm still playing with the reduction "algorithm"
- Here is how the current incarnation of the approach works...

## The Honing "Algorithm"

- Start from the last case and step back to find the window
  - 100. 99, 100. 98, 99, 100. 40, 41 ... 99, 100
- Start eliminating sequential bundles (ratio to window-size) and check for fault
- Once exhausted, increase granularity to eliminate single test cases at a time
- Sulleys health-restoration methods are used to ensure a "clean slate" per test

## Parallel Fuzzing

- Combinatorial explosion is a common fuzzing problem
- We can increase throughput by replicating the target, ex:
  - Run 2 targets in VMWare with PyDbg monitoring
  - Run a target on real hardware for MSR-based code coverage recording
- Parallel fuzzing is as simple as instantiating and add multiple targets in your driver code

## Heuristic Feedback Loop

- Along the same lines as the fuzz extender command-line utility
- Simple concept that may improve your fuzz:
  - Attach to the target process and trace
  - Look for all comparisons to int and string constants
  - Feed those back to the fuzzer, adding them to the current primitives fuzz library
- There are far more scientific ways of doing this
  - Hoglund and Halvar both are researching what I call "path-math"
  - Was talking to a friend at Microsoft, they already have it

# Code Coverage Monitor

- An agent similar to netmon or procmon, records code coverage per test case
- There are 2 code coverage monitors completed
  - MSR based
  - Process Stalker based
- Neither are included as they add a lot more requirements (PaiMei)
- We're working on PaiMei 2.0 which will be SQL driven and will include it then

# PCAP Binning

- Crash binning is great, we can apply it to packets as well
  - Monitor and parse network responses from target
  - Group them together as best we can
  - ex: 404 responses vs. 202 responses from a web server
- Most useful when you are fuzzing a target you can't monitor with other tools
  - Say the Xbox for example

# File Fuzzing

- The session class, driver etc. was all designed for network protocol fuzzing
- The data representation stuff however is generic
- Peter Silberman has already written a beta file-session for file fuzzing
- Alternatively, you can...
  - Represent the file in Sulley blocks
  - Write a 3 line `.render()` loop to generate your test cases
  - Use Cody Pierce's PaiMei FileFuzz module as a testing harness

## Web Based GUI

- Coding up blocks is an easy task, but not easy enough for widespread use
- We'd like to have a drag and drop GUI
  - Create and nest blocks visually
  - Insert, re-arrange, etc. primitives
  - View and modify options for each primitive
  - Save it off to a request library
  - Create a session and connect requests
  - Configure and add targets
  - Generate the driver automatically
- We have no GUI skills, someone else needs to do this

## Appliance Based Distribution

- Extending on the previous though...
- With a nice GUI we can move to an appliance model
  - Distribute Sulley as a virtual machine
- Simply start it up, configure over web and attack a target
- We can do auto updates, etc...
- Maybe one day

## Questions? Comments?

- About the tool
- About ...

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